Thursday, August 26, 2010

Iraq: Mission Accomplished again

An interesting read and good overview of the difficulties that were encountered in Iraq, as well as lessons learned. This one is especially valuable:

Partnership with sub-national actors is essential to promoting sovereignty.

In the 1990s, the United States too readily handed off transition to international partners like the United Nations in Somalia and Haiti or NATO in Bosnia and Kosovo. This created the false perception that the international community can administer territories in lieu of indigenous governance. But Iraq teaches that Iraqis hold the key to Iraqi governance to work through their own security, political, and economic challenges. External actors can only enable or disrupt indigenous efforts and not replace them.

We should certainly take note of the milestone created by U.S. troop reductions in Iraq, but from a practical matter, we cannot overlook that there are still 50,000 U.S. military personnel there. These forces are continuing to enable Iraq to make U.S. forces and assistance redundant, which is the overriding national security goal. While over-used, the slogan “when they stand-up, we stand-down” is starting to hold true. It just took a little longer than expected

My only quibble is what looks to be a claim that Bush was dishonest in making his case for war with Hussein's Iraq:

While, it is easy to fault the Bush Administration for invading Iraq under false pretenses, the administration should get some credit for attempting to solve the problems it created. Like it or not, Iraq and the United States now have a special relationship that will continue beyond 2011

But, that is a very old and tired argument and I'd rather not open that wound yet again. Like I said, aside from that swipe, the piece is quite good, and fair to Bush.

Let me get this straight..Colonel Sellin doesn't like PowerPoint?

PowerPoints 'R' Us

I read this as I sit here going over my own Powerpoint materials for the Intro Philosophy course I'm teaching this term. I was a low tech lecturer before I came to the Academy, but now believe I have accumulated enough hours to earn the civilian equivalent of the coveted 5000 hour PowerPoint Ranger patch.

This piece by the good Colonel is an all-timer, and must be immediately added to the material over at the PowerPoint Ranger site.

In full:

KABUL, Afghanistan, Aug. 24 (UPI) -- Throughout my career I have been known to walk that fine line between good taste and unemployment. I see no reason to change that now.

Consider the following therapeutic.

I have been assigned as a staff officer to a headquarters in Afghanistan for about two months. During that time, I have not done anything productive. Fortunately little of substance is really done here, but that is a task we do well.

We are part of the operational arm of the International Security Assistance Force commanded by U.S. Army Gen. David Petraeus. It is composed of military representatives from all the NATO countries, several of which I cannot pronounce.

Officially, IJC was founded in late 2009 to coordinate operations among all the regional commands in Afghanistan. More likely it was founded to provide some general a three-star command. Starting with a small group of dedicated and intelligent officers, IJC has successfully grown into a stove-piped and bloated organization, top-heavy in rank. Around here you can't swing a dead cat without hitting a colonel.

For headquarters staff, war consists largely of the endless tinkering with PowerPoint slides to conform with the idiosyncrasies of cognitively challenged generals in order to spoon-feed them information. Even one tiny flaw in a slide can halt a general's thought processes as abruptly as a computer system's blue screen of death.

The ability to brief well is, therefore, a critical skill. It is important to note that skill in briefing resides in how you say it. It doesn't matter so much what you say or even if you are speaking Klingon.

Random motion, ad hoc processes and an in-depth knowledge of Army minutia and acronyms are also key characteristics of a successful staff officer. Harried movement together with furrowed brows and appropriate expressions of concern a la Clint Eastwood will please the generals. Progress in the war is optional.

Each day is guided by the "battle rhythm," which is a series of PowerPoint briefings and meetings with PowerPoint presentations. It doesn't matter how inane or useless the briefing or meeting might be. Once it is part of the battle rhythm, it has the persistence of carbon 14.

And you can't skip these events because they take roll -- just like gym class.

The start and culmination of each day is the commander's update assessment. Please ignore the fact that "update assessment" is redundant. Simply saying commander's update doesn't provide the possibility of creating a three-letter acronym. It also doesn't matter that the commander never attends the CUA.

The CUA consists of a series of PowerPoint slides describing the events of the previous 12 hours. Briefers explain each slide by reading from a written statement in a tone not unlike that of a congressman caught in a tryst with an escort. The CUA slides only change when a new commander arrives or the war ends.

The commander's immediate subordinates, usually one- and two-star generals, listen to the CUA in a semi-comatose state. Each briefer has approximately 1 or 2 minutes to impart either information or misinformation. Usually they don't do either. Fortunately, none of the information provided makes an indelible impact on any of the generals.

One important task of the IJC is to share information to the ISAF commander, his staff and to all the regional commands. This information is delivered as PowerPoint slides in e-mail at the flow rate of a fire hose. Standard operating procedure is to send everything that you have. Volume is considered the equivalent of quality.

Next month IJC will attempt a giant leap for mankind. In a first-of-its-kind effort, IJC will embed a new stovepipe into an already existing stovepipe. The rationale for this bold move resides in the fact that an officer, who is currently without one, needs a staff of 35 people to create a big splash before his promotion board.

Like most military organizations, structure always trumps function.

The ultimate consequences of this reorganization won't be determined until after that officer rotates out of theater.

Nevertheless, the results will be presented by PowerPoint.


(Lawrence Sellin, Ph.D., is a colonel in the U.S. Army Reserve and a veteran of the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq. He is currently serving his second deployment to Afghanistan. The views expressed are his own and do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. Army or U.S. government.)